Lessons from North Korean Nuclear Negotiations
By Piero A. TozziSenior Director of China Policy at the America First Policy Institute
President Ronald Reagan made famous a maxim that summarized his approach to negotiating nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union during the Cold War: “Trust—but verify.”
The key takeaway from my America First Policy Institute colleague Frederick Fleitz’ North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship and the Oval Office, recently published by Texas A&M University Press, is “Verify—but by no means trust.”
Ronald Reagan understood the nature of the regime he was dealing with—an empire he called “Evil,” and an existential threat to the United States and like-minded countries throughout the world. He also had a clear teleological objective in mind: the collapse of that Evil Empire and Cold War victory.
Too often, we learn from Fleitz’ book, American presidents and negotiators from both Republican and Democratic administrations—at least until the first Trump Administration—failed to understand the nature and intentions of North Korea’s ruling Kim family dynasty. In Fleitz’ blunt assessment, “North Korea has always intended to use its nuclear technology to make weapons.”
In contrast, American negotiators too often project their aspirations onto their negotiating opposites, focusing on obtaining parchment guarantees as career-enhancing, prized baubles. This mindset has led to successive failures—the negotiation process becomes an end in itself, victory measured in terms of commitments (subsequently broken) that at best extend timelines, and concessions made that end up subsidizing what is arguably the most brutal tyranny on the planet, a tyranny that single-mindedly pursued acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and delivery systems capable of threatening adversaries near and far, not least of which has been the United States.
In contrast, the North Koreans have been very consistent in maintaining a three-step approach to nuclear negotiations: Step One—engage in provocative behavior and saber rattling, thereby raising concern levels in capitals; Step Two—obtain concessions, and offer little if anything in return, thereby gaining more concessions; and Step Three—when an agreement is finally brokered, only partially comply, and when counterparts complain, restart the process by renewing provocations.
During the Cold War, the Soviets were said to apply Pavlovian psychology in their approach to negotiations with Americans, such as during the first and second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty negotiations. Understanding what their American counterparts desired—a deliverable treaty, which could be spun to the voting public as a victory for peace while assuaging nuclear fears—the Soviets would open the door and appear flexible and willing to negotiate, only to then shut the door, creating great angst and agita within the State Department and various administrations (akin to Pavlov’s salivating dogs, per the metaphor), conditioning American negotiators throughout the process and thereby obtaining concessions and controlling outcomes.
