How the Samsung, SK Hynix, Semes, and OLED Cases Expose the Real Pathways of Korean Technology Leakage
June 29, 2026
By Jean Cummings
Co-Editor-in-Chief and Senior Columnist, The Korea Signal
The U.S. congressional Armed Services Committees’ request in the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act report for the Secretary of Defense to assess the “malicious influence of the Chinese Communist Party inside South Korea” did not arise from abstract diplomatic concern alone. It reflects a series of concrete incidents that have already surfaced repeatedly inside South Korea. Among the most serious areas are semiconductor talent recruitment and technology leakage.
China does not view South Korean semiconductor companies merely as commercial competitors. It has worked to narrow the technology gap by directly recruiting engineers, researchers, process specialists, equipment operators, and yield managers who gained hands-on experience at companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix.
What China wants is not a degree or a title. It wants technical personnel who have accumulated real mass-production experience inside Korean semiconductor companies.
As the United States has moved to block the flow of advanced semiconductor equipment, AI chips, and core manufacturing technology into China, Beijing has shifted toward taking Korean technical personnel instead of simply buying equipment. In effect, China is using the experience and shop-floor knowledge of Korean semiconductor engineers to bypass U.S. technology controls.
The Attempt to Replicate a Samsung Semiconductor Fab in China
The most symbolic case involved a former Samsung Electronics executive who allegedly attempted to replicate a Samsung semiconductor fabrication plant in China.
On June 12, 2023, Korean prosecutors indicted a former Samsung executive on charges of stealing Samsung technology to establish a copycat semiconductor plant in China. Prosecutors treated the case as a major threat to South Korea’s national economic security.
The individual, identified as A, was accused of taking Samsung semiconductor factory design materials, BED files, process layouts, and factory blueprints in order to build a semiconductor plant in China. The technologies involved were sub-30 nanometer DRAM and NAND flash process technologies, classified as national core technologies.
The key point in this case is that this was not merely the removal of a few documents. According to prosecutors, A and his associates attempted to build a Samsung-style semiconductor plant only about 1.5 kilometers away from Samsung’s existing plant in Xi’an, China, and the plan also included personnel recruitment. A offered Korean semiconductor personnel twice their salary and recruited roughly 200 people into his company. He also secured a 460 billion won investment commitment from the city of Chengdu.
This was not a simple technology leak. It was an attempt to move to China the factory design, line layout, production operation methods, and field personnel that Korean companies had built over decades.
The same former Samsung executive, Choi Jin-seok, was later detained again on new allegations related to the theft of 20-nanometer-class DRAM process technology. He had already been on trial over the earlier allegation involving a copycat semiconductor plant in China, and the new allegations reportedly involved Samsung chip process technology. Choi has denied the charges, but the case shows that the attempted relocation of Korean semiconductor process technology and personnel to China was not a one-time incident.
The Samsung 10-Nanometer-Class DRAM Technology Leak to CXMT
A more direct case emerged in December 2025. Korean prosecutors indicted ten former Samsung executives and engineers on charges of leaking advanced memory manufacturing technology to ChangXin Memory Technologies, or CXMT. The companies involved were Samsung Electronics and China’s CXMT. The leaked technology was Samsung’s 10-nanometer-class DRAM process technology, which Samsung had reportedly spent about 1.6 trillion won to develop.
CXMT is China’s first DRAM semiconductor company, established in 2016 with investment from a Chinese local government and a Chinese semiconductor design company. According to prosecutors, shortly after its founding, CXMT hired a former Samsung department head as its development director. That individual then recruited key process personnel in order to obtain Samsung’s 10-nanometer-class DRAM process technology.
In the course of this operation, they allegedly created a front company, moved offices repeatedly, and even agreed to send specific code words if a travel ban or arrest situation occurred.
The most shocking detail was that a Samsung researcher, identified as B, directly copied by hand PRP information — process recipe information at the heart of DRAM production — before moving to CXMT.
Prosecutors said B copied 600 process steps by hand into 12 employee notebooks and carried them out. Normally, technology leak cases involve file copying, photography, email transmission, or USB storage. In this case, however, handwritten transcription appeared. More than 600 process steps, gas flow rates, photoresist conditions, and other core manufacturing conditions were recorded by hand.
According to prosecutors, CXMT later recruited additional Samsung employees and began DRAM development. It also obtained process-related technology from SK Hynix through suppliers. As a result, CXMT became the first Chinese company to succeed in producing 10-nanometer-class DRAM in 2023. Prosecutors estimated that this case alone caused Samsung 5 trillion won in lost sales in 2024, and that broader national economic damage could reach at least tens of trillions of won.
The HBM connection is the part that must not be missed. Prosecutors determined that the illegal use of this technology provided the foundation for CXMT’s HBM development. This means the DRAM technology leak did not stop at ordinary memory technology. It could lead directly into high-bandwidth memory, or HBM, which is essential for AI computation.
On April 22, 2026, a Korean court sentenced a former Samsung researcher to seven years in prison for leaking semiconductor manufacturing technology to CXMT, after finding that the leaked information constituted national core technology.
This case shows how precise China’s talent recruitment strategy has become. Chinese companies knew which technologies they needed from Korean semiconductor firms, identified the people who possessed them, and selected them for recruitment. Moreover, they did not stop with one person. They recruited additional key personnel by process area and connected those people to China’s own production capability.
From the U.S. defense perspective, this case is highly direct. DRAM and HBM are core components in AI servers and advanced computing systems. If China obtains Korean DRAM manufacturing technology and process recipes, China’s AI semiconductor ecosystem gains breathing room even under U.S. sanctions. The United States is blocking AI chips and advanced equipment, but China is trying to reduce production problems by recruiting people trained in Korea who have actually handled those processes. This is sanctions evasion through people.
The United States is working to prevent advanced semiconductor technology and manufacturing capability from flowing into China by strengthening equipment export controls and technology access restrictions. However, if semiconductor manufacturing personnel trained in Korea, along with people who have factory operation experience and production-line design experience, move to China, Beijing can accelerate development even under U.S. sanctions. Sanctioning China alone will not stop technology leakage. If Washington does not block talent movement and technology leakage through Korea, one of the leading countries in semiconductor technology, China will continue to use Korea as a bypass route.
That is why Washington must watch Korea more closely.
The case is significant in that core South Korean semiconductor technologies were leaked over an extended period and left unaddressed during the Moon Jae-in administration, which maintained close ties with China and North Korea. Comprehensive investigations and indictments began only in 2023 under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, but the final ruling was substantially delayed. In the interim, damages continued to accumulate. The compromised technologies were incorporated into Chinese firms’ production lines and development systems, enabling CXMT to advance its technical capabilities. By the time South Korea secured convictions, the relevant DRAM process had already become nearly a decade old due to generational shifts in semiconductor technology. China had already secured the transferred capabilities, while South Korea had lost market share and competitiveness. Accordingly, while the ruling establishes legal accountability, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that justice was delivered too late to mitigate the national-level damage.
SK Hynix and HBM-Related Technology Leak Cases
SK Hynix-related cases have also appeared repeatedly.
In May 2025, a former employee of an SK Hynix supplier was arrested at Incheon International Airport while attempting to take HBM, or high-bandwidth memory, core component process data to China. Korean authorities arrested the former supplier employee at the airport, and he was accused of trying to smuggle SK Hynix HBM packaging technology to China.
In another SK Hynix case, an employee who had worked at the company’s China sales subsidiary was linked to HiSilicon, Huawei’s semiconductor subsidiary. On May 7, 2025, a former SK Hynix employee was indicted under arrest on charges of leaking advanced semiconductor technology, including next-generation HBM manufacturing processes, to a Chinese competitor. The employee was caught while attempting to move to HiSilicon while still in possession of SK Hynix technology.
The technologies mentioned in this case included 3D NAND, HBM, multi-chiplet assembly, CIS, and advanced packaging. The leaked materials also included CIS and hybrid bonding technology. Hybrid bonding is an advanced technology used to bond multiple wafers in NAND flash or image sensors, and it is directly connected to next-generation packaging.
These cases matter because China is not simply targeting memory processes. HBM, hybrid bonding, CIS, advanced packaging, equipment operation, and yield management — the technologies that sustain South Korea’s actual semiconductor production capability — are all becoming targets. HiSilicon is Huawei’s core semiconductor unit and has been under U.S. sanctions. Korean semiconductor personnel and data flowing toward HiSilicon directly collide with U.S. technology restrictions on China.
The more serious problem is that China is not targeting only Korean headquarters. It can access internal information from Korean semiconductor companies through Chinese local subsidiaries, customer contact points, sales and technical support personnel, suppliers, overseas staff, and job transitions. Actual cases show that Chinese firms knew which technologies were needed inside Korean semiconductor companies, identified the people who had those technologies, and recruited them. Moreover, they did not stop after taking one person. They pulled in additional key personnel by process area and connected those recruits to China’s own production capability.
This is exactly where the U.S. Department of Defense must pay attention: the weakness of South Korea’s defenses against technology leakage. In particular, as Chinese influence inside Korea is expanding rapidly, these cases must not be dismissed as isolated incidents.
From a U.S. defense standpoint, these cases are highly direct. DRAM and HBM are core components in AI servers and advanced computing equipment. If China obtains Korean DRAM manufacturing technology and process recipes, it can improve memory production and packaging capabilities even without sufficient access to U.S. AI chips and advanced equipment. While the United States blocks the flow of AI chips and advanced equipment into China, Beijing is recruiting people in Korea who have actually handled those processes in order to reduce production problems. This is sanctions evasion through people.
The United States is strengthening equipment export controls and technology access restrictions to prevent advanced semiconductor technology and manufacturing capability from flowing into China. But if Korean-trained semiconductor manufacturing personnel, factory operation experience, and production-line design experience move to China, Beijing can shorten its development timeline even under U.S. sanctions. Sanctioning only China does not stop technology leakage. If the United States fails to block personnel movement and technology leakage through Korea, a country at the forefront of semiconductor technology, China will continue to use Korea as a bypass route.
This is why Washington must examine Korea more closely.
The Semes Semiconductor Equipment Technology Leak
The case involving Semes, a Samsung Electronics subsidiary, is another important example of technology leakage to China. Semes manufactures semiconductor cleaning equipment, and this case shows that China is not only targeting Korean finished semiconductors or design technology. It is also trying to obtain equipment technology necessary for actual production.
In January 2023, five former Semes employees were indicted on charges of leaking core semiconductor cleaning equipment technology to China. The technologies they were accused of taking included core blueprints for supercritical semiconductor cleaning equipment and technology related to single-wafer phosphoric acid cleaning equipment.
The case did not end there.
In January 2024, seven employees and executives of a domestic semiconductor cleaning equipment company were also indicted on charges of illegally leaking semiconductor cleaning equipment technology to China. Investigators believed they did not export the equipment in one complete shipment. Instead, they allegedly shipped it in parts multiple times and reassembled it in China. In other words, what China wanted was not one finished machine. It wanted the entire process of how the machine was made, assembled, and operated.
Moreover, a former Semes researcher who had been put on trial for leaking wet semiconductor cleaning equipment technology to China received a heavier sentence on appeal. The Suwon High Court overturned the lower court ruling and sentenced the individual to five years in prison, while also imposing a 1.5 billion won fine on the related corporate entity. This means the Semes case was not a simple act of individual misconduct. It was a serious case in which Korean semiconductor equipment technology flowed to China.
The core of the Semes case is also people. When former researchers, suppliers, brokers, and Chinese buyers connect, China can pull Korean semiconductor equipment technology out of the country. Cleaning equipment is critical for removing contaminants during semiconductor manufacturing. If this equipment does not operate properly, defects increase and production efficiency declines.
Semiconductors cannot be manufactured with blueprints alone. Running an actual fab requires knowing which equipment to use, under what operating conditions it should be used, and how to control contamination during the process. This is exactly why China is targeting Korea’s cleaning equipment technology.
For the United States, this case also connects to equipment export controls. Even if the United States blocks advanced lithography equipment and major process equipment from entering China, Beijing can reduce some production problems if it obtains Korea’s cleaning equipment technology and equipment operation experience. China does not need only advanced lithography equipment. To run real fabs, it needs cleaning equipment, etching equipment, deposition equipment, packaging equipment, and the operating conditions for all of them.
OLED and Display Technology Leaks to China
Alongside semiconductors, display technology is also a major target of Chinese technology leakage. Semiconductors and displays are different industries, but the way China targets Korean technical personnel and process technology is similar.
In October 2023, a former Samsung Display researcher was arrested and indicted on charges of transferring Samsung Display’s OLED technology to China. Prosecutors believed that the former researcher worked with other researchers to extract Samsung Display’s OLED technology and attempted to transfer it to China through a company he had established.
The case led to a court ruling in July 2024. The former Samsung Display researcher was sentenced to six years in prison for leaking OLED manufacturing technology to China.
But the technology leaked in this case was not simple component information. It included ELA, or excimer laser annealing, used in OLED manufacturing, as well as OCR inkjet process technology used to attach cover glass to OLED panels. These are core manufacturing technologies necessary for OLED production.
Data released by the Korean National Police Agency’s National Office of Investigation points to the same problem. From January to October 2024, 25 overseas technology leakage cases were detected, and 18 of them were China-related. By industry, eight involved displays and seven involved semiconductors. That means China is focusing on Korea’s core manufacturing industries.
The methods of leakage were also not simple. Technology left the country through photography, email, social media, USB storage, printed materials, and personnel movement. In one case, four people were arrested for photographing OLED-related national core technology and transferring it to the Chinese side, and two of them were detained. They had photographed OLED-related technology for use after moving to an overseas competitor.
OLED and semiconductor technology leakage are not separate issues. China continues to select and take the technologies and people it needs from Korean manufacturing sectors where Korea has led the market. The rapid rise of Chinese display companies against Korean competitors is also linked to this pattern of technology leakage and personnel movement.
Furthermore, display and OLED technology are connected to the U.S. defense industry. Advanced displays are used not only in smartphones and televisions, but also in fighter aircraft cockpits, military drones, surveillance equipment, satellite and aerospace systems, communications equipment, and AI devices. If China obtains Korean OLED process technology and display manufacturing personnel, Chinese components can erode this market, forcing U.S. defense companies and allied firms to spend more money finding alternative supply chains.
What National Core Technology Leakage Statistics Show
Figures from the Korean National Police Agency’s National Office of Investigation show that China-related technology leakage is not a one-time issue. From January to October 2024, 18 of the 25 overseas technology leakage cases detected by police were related to China. National core technology leakage cases numbered one in 2021, four in 2022, and two in 2023, but rose to ten in 2024. Of course, these figures reflect only the cases detected by law enforcement authorities. The actual scale of technology leaked overseas may be larger than the confirmed cases indicate.
The same trend continued in the 2025 crackdown. According to reports on January 19, 2026, Korean police detected 179 technology leakage crimes in 2025 and arrested 378 people. Overseas leakage cases reached 33, the highest number ever recorded, and China was the largest destination, with 18 cases.
China’s share of overseas leakage cases reportedly rose from 50 percent in 2022 to 68.1 percent in 2023 and 74.1 percent in 2024, before falling to 54.5 percent in 2025. Even then, China still accounted for the largest share. Many technology leakage crimes were committed by insiders, including employees of victim companies, and small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for a very high share of the damage.
What these figures show is clear. China’s technology theft is not carried out through external hacking alone. China approaches Korean technical personnel through insiders, retirees, supplier employees, overseas subsidiary staff, headhunters, and consulting firms. South Korea may claim that major corporate headquarters have security personnel and internal controls, but once the issue moves to suppliers, retirees, overseas subsidiaries, and small and medium-sized firms, access-rights management and document-removal controls are nearly defenseless. China exploits those gaps and continues to take Korean engineers and process information.
South Korea is far more vulnerable on security than many expect.
The government responds after incidents erupt by punishing a few people, but that approach cannot stop Chinese technology theft through Korea. Korean media and industry reports repeatedly expose the recruitment methods used by Chinese semiconductor firms, but those are only the cases that have surfaced. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that Korean technical personnel and process information are flowing to China on a much wider scale in places not yet visible.
This is exactly what the U.S. Department of Defense must examine.
Washington must conduct stricter investigations into China’s technology acquisition routes through South Korea and continue strengthening the necessary controls. At the same time, South Korean authorities and semiconductor companies should strengthen security awareness training for personnel with access to national core technologies, tighten insider-risk management, and reinforce controls over overseas recruitment and technology transfers.
China’s Methods for Hunting Korean Semiconductor Talent
In the past, Chinese firms tried to recruit senior executives and top research leaders with high salaries. Recently, however, they have more actively targeted younger hands-on technical personnel with five to ten years of experience, and more broadly five to fifteen years of experience. These people may not hold the highest corporate titles, but they have actually run production lines. They have handled equipment problems, adjusted process conditions, identified defect causes, and improved yields.
There are also analyses that China has shifted toward proactively attracting younger talent under 40. If the old Thousand Talents Program focused on bringing in world-class scholars or top-tier researchers, the current approach is to recruit younger working-level engineers before they fully mature inside Korean firms and encourage them to put down roots in China.
Chinese firms have repeatedly been found to offer Korean semiconductor personnel two to three times their existing salaries, and sometimes three to five times their existing salaries. On top of that, they add signing bonuses worth hundreds of millions of won, housing support, family relocation assistance, children’s education support, fast-track promotions, and leadership positions on major projects. In the CXMT case, some development team personnel were reportedly paid three to five times their Samsung salaries while participating in technology leakage and development.
China’s talent approach often involves headhunters operating around Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix campuses. To avoid restrictions on employment with competitors in the same industry, recruits may first move to a consulting company or another type of entity and then transfer to a semiconductor company after some time has passed. This is a bypass route designed to absorb key personnel while avoiding legal restrictions.
SMIC cannot be left out of this discussion. SMIC, China’s largest foundry, was added to the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List in December 2020. The U.S. government placed SMIC under export controls due to concerns related to China’s military-civil fusion policy and the Chinese military-industrial complex. This means SMIC is not merely a private semiconductor company. It is a core target in U.S. technology controls against China.
Even under U.S. controls, SMIC has continued pursuing advanced processes. Huawei and SMIC were reportedly involved in developing advanced 7-nanometer-class chips in 2023 using technology from U.S. equipment makers. If SMIC improves its foundry process capability, it opens breathing room for AI, communications, and military-use semiconductor development by Chinese technology firms such as Huawei.
In February 2026, Applied Materials reportedly agreed to pay $252 million to the U.S. Commerce Department over illegal exports of semiconductor equipment to SMIC. Reuters reported that the equipment was manufactured in the United States, assembled at a Korean subsidiary, and then sent to SMIC in China. This case shows that Korea can be used not simply as a nearby country, but as a route for equipment assembly, re-export, and supply-chain circumvention in China’s semiconductor technology acquisition.
As SMIC faces restricted access to equipment, demand for Korean equipment operators, process-experienced personnel, and supplier engineers can only grow. CXMT needs DRAM and next-generation memory personnel. YMTC needs NAND flash and memory manufacturing experience. SMIC needs foundry and advanced process experience.
These three companies are core pillars of China’s semiconductor self-reliance strategy, and Korean engineers are becoming the fastest route for them to close the technology gap.
What Blind and Corporate Internal Communities Reveal
The internal atmosphere inside Korean companies is also an important source of information.
During Samsung Electronics’ labor-management conflict and wage negotiations in 2026, a post appeared on Blind, an anonymous workplace community, saying in effect that if negotiations collapsed, the writer would move to CXMT and leak technology. This was closer to an expression of internal discontent linked to a possible move to a Chinese company than an actual criminal plan. But the important point is that CXMT is already being discussed as a realistic destination among Korean semiconductor personnel.
The larger problem is that South Korea is now under the control of a far-left government, while political circles across party lines maintain close exchanges with China. At the same time, Korean media have intensified efforts to present China favorably and spread anti-American sentiment. As a result, many Koreans are becoming more likely to view China not as a dangerous communist system, but as a country with which South Korea should cooperate.
South Korea has a highly educated population. But the far-left, pro-North Korea, pro-China Lee Jae-myung administration, dominated by radical left-wing figures, is pressuring companies through the Yellow Envelope Act — an amendment to the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act that expands the scope of employers and labor disputes while limiting damage claims related to strikes — as part of its effort to transform South Korea into a radical socialist system. As this leads to a decline in domestic jobs, the outflow of technical personnel to China will only accelerate. If Chinese companies, located close to Korea and increasingly portrayed in a friendly light inside Korean society, offer high salaries, the structure that pushes Korean engineers toward China becomes much easier to create.
Conservative citizens view this internal situation as a very serious national security crisis. But South Korean society as a whole still does not treat the issue as a danger of national technology leakage. Many Koreans, conditioned by years of media coverage that has beautified China and promoted anti-American narratives, do not hear serious warnings from the opposition about Chinese influence inside Korea. As a result, many people see high-paying job offers from Chinese companies not as a security threat, but as a simple employment opportunity.
From the American perspective, this may be a security problem. But the reality for Korean engineers is different. The United States has high visa and employment barriers and is not an easy country to move to for work. China, however, is geographically close and has a comparatively easier transition process. If Chinese companies add high salaries to that equation, a move to China can be perceived by Korean engineers not as a security problem, but as a realistic career option.
Comments such as “if key personnel become angry at the company, Chinese firms will take them immediately,” “internal dissatisfaction inside Korean firms becomes a pathway for Chinese talent recruitment,” and “jobs and income matter more than security pledges” have appeared. This trend shows that personnel management and compensation problems inside Korean semiconductor firms are now directly connected to industrial security.
The Korean government’s response appears stronger on the surface.
Companies are strengthening nondisclosure agreements, non-compete clauses, retirement security checks, document-removal controls, smartphone photography restrictions, internal audits, and security education. Some companies are also improving treatment for key personnel through salary increases and expanded stock options. The government says it is strengthening national core technology protection systems and punishments for technology leakage.
But in practice, these measures are not enough. A nondisclosure agreement is ultimately a promise on paper, and once technology has moved into a person’s head and experience, proving a leak becomes difficult. Non-compete clauses also collide with freedom of occupational choice. Moreover, under a government pushing rapid socialist policies, unions gain even greater power, and the tools companies have to prevent key personnel from moving become weaker.
For many years, powerful far-left, anti-American unions such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions have pressured companies and shaken the political establishment. But after the Lee Jae-myung administration came to power, far-left unions gained even more power, and the government has brought the media and judiciary under the influence of pro-government forces.
In particular, the Lee Jae-myung administration and the Democratic Party of Korea are continuing to push their so-called “prosecution reform” policy, which sharply limits and separates the prosecution’s investigative powers. They are attempting in principle to strip prosecutors of the authority to directly investigate serious crimes. This is an extension of the “complete deprivation of prosecutorial investigative powers” agenda that began under the Moon Jae-in administration, and under the Lee administration it is being pursued even more aggressively to pressure prosecutors. As of May and June 2026, related bills and internal discussions were still moving forward, and the effort is likely to intensify after the local elections.
In this environment, courts are likely to view corporate non-compete restrictions and limits on retirees as excessive restrictions on workers. As a result, the enforceability of corporate security measures will inevitably weaken. In other words, the responsibility for stopping engineers from leaving for China is effectively being pushed onto companies’ own internal security systems. But when the government itself is actively promoting deeper exchanges with China, companies alone will inevitably face limits in stopping talent outflow and technology leakage.
Retiree security checks also have clear limits. They can check for data removal at the moment of departure, but it is almost impossible to block a retiree’s path months later through a third-country entity, consulting company, research advisory contract, or Chinese local partner.
Suppliers and small and medium-sized equipment firms are even more vulnerable. Major corporate headquarters have security gates, photography controls, and document-removal approval systems. But suppliers often lack personnel-management systems and internal security budgets. China targets these weak links. Core equipment blueprints, component processes, cleaning, etching, and packaging know-how do not exist only inside major company headquarters. Supplier employees, field engineers, outsourced equipment technicians, and former researchers each carry part of that technology.
Government regulation is covered by strong-sounding political rhetoric, while actual investigation remains insufficient. In this environment, who will track exactly when a Chinese firm approached a Korean engineer, what salary and position it offered, which intermediate entity it used, and which former colleague made the connection?
Korea’s Semiconductor Labor Shortage and Overseas Outflow
South Korea’s semiconductor industry also faces a severe labor shortage. According to reports citing projections by the Korea Semiconductor Industry Association, the number of workers needed in Korea’s semiconductor industry is expected to rise from 177,000 in 2021 to 304,000 by 2031. That means an additional 127,000 workers will be needed over ten years. Other reports have projected that Korea could face a shortage of roughly 54,000 semiconductor workers by 2031.
The problem is that existing personnel are leaving for overseas destinations before Korea can train enough new workers at home. In 2025, reports stated that industry sources believed roughly 1,000 Korean semiconductor personnel had moved to China over the previous six years since 2018. This figure aligns with claims frequently cited by Korean conservative independent journalists on social media and YouTube that China has already penetrated deeply into Korea’s semiconductor talent pool.
The United States, China, and Japan all want Korean semiconductor personnel.
U.S. companies emphasize AI semiconductors, design, advanced packaging, and research and development environments. Japan, backed by government support, is pursuing a semiconductor revival and looking for Korean talent. China is far more direct: it offers money, titles, and project authority. Korean conservatives see the difference this way: moving to the United States is closer to a career transition, while moving to China carries the risk of technology transfer. This has led to growing conservative demands that the United States take the issue seriously and intervene.
The salaries and bonuses offered by Chinese firms shake the defenses of Korean companies. Even if Korean firms improve compensation to some extent, a Chinese company offering short-term high compensation, housing and family support, and a project leadership role becomes a powerful temptation for mid-career engineers. For engineers facing stalled promotions and accumulated dissatisfaction with performance bonuses inside Korean companies, a Chinese offer is not simply an overseas job change. It can look like an opportunity to receive a huge payout at once in exchange for their technology.
Security cannot be protected through punishment alone. If core personnel do not feel a reason to remain inside their company and country, Chinese money becomes a stronger weapon. If Korea fails to train enough semiconductor personnel and existing personnel continue to leave for China, Korean technology leakage will ultimately deliver a direct blow to U.S. security.
The KISTEP Report and China’s Rapid Catch-Up
A 2025 analysis by KISTEP, the Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, delivered a shocking assessment of Korea’s semiconductor technology level. According to a Yonhap report on February 23, 2025, an expert survey found that China had overtaken Korea in most semiconductor technology areas within just two years. The report recommended training core talent and preventing the loss of existing talent.
More specifically, reports said China was rated higher than Korea in areas such as high-performance, low-power AI semiconductor technology, power semiconductors, and next-generation high-performance sensing technology. Advanced packaging was assessed as being at the same level in Korea and China. TrendForce also cited the report, stating that China was rated higher than Korea in AI semiconductors, power semiconductors, and next-generation sensing, while advanced packaging was rated at the same level.
This report shocked Korean conservatives. Reactions included claims that “China has already caught up with Korea,” “the result of Korean engineers moving to China is now appearing in numbers,” and “Korea is trapped in the old pride of being a memory powerhouse.” In this environment, semiconductor talent leakage is no longer treated as a simple corporate personnel issue. It is being treated as a matter of national survival.
Recent moves by CXMT and YMTC make the situation even more dangerous. CXMT is seeking to raise about $4.2 billion through a Shanghai listing to upgrade DRAM production lines and invest in advanced DRAM research and development. CXMT is China’s leading DRAM company and is challenging the global DRAM market long dominated by Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, and Micron.
On April 14, 2026, Reuters reported that YMTC was planning two additional factories beyond an almost completed facility, and that the three plants could more than double its production capacity. YMTC is China’s leading NAND flash company.
When CXMT and YMTC expand production capacity, what they need most is not equipment alone. They need people who can stabilize processes and raise yields. Large investments and factory expansion lead directly to demand for field personnel. CXMT, which is expanding DRAM, needs DRAM process personnel from Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. YMTC, which is expanding NAND flash, needs people with NAND process and equipment operation experience. China’s production expansion increases pressure to recruit Korean personnel.
How Korean Conservatives View China’s Semiconductor Talent Recruitment
Korean citizens, especially most conservatives, are deeply concerned by the rapid expansion of Chinese influence inside Korea since the rise of a far-left, pro-China government. They do not view semiconductor talent leakage as a simple matter of job mobility or corporate competition. They believe China is systematically using money, titles, and research conditions to take Korean semiconductor personnel, and that Korea’s core manufacturing know-how is moving to China as a result.
The arguments repeatedly raised by conservatives generally fall into four categories.
First, they argue that China is buying Korean semiconductor personnel with money. Chinese firms offer Korean engineers two, three, and in some cases five times their current salaries, along with housing support, signing bonuses, family relocation support, rapid promotion, and leadership roles on large projects. Multiple media reports have repeatedly mentioned salary offers of two to three times, or three to five times, existing salaries. Conservatives view this not as normal global talent competition, but as China buying Korea’s semiconductor production experience with money.
Second, they argue that China is focusing on retirees and suppliers connected to Korea’s major companies. The security networks at Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix headquarters may be strong, but retirees, suppliers, overseas subsidiaries, and small and medium-sized equipment firms are far more vulnerable. Police statistics have also shown that many technology leakage cases were carried out by insiders and that many incidents occurred at small and medium-sized firms. Conservatives believe China does not knock on the strongest door. It finds the weakest door and enters there.
Third, they argue that China is not merely stealing documents. It is stealing Korea’s production experience. Semiconductors are not an industry that can be learned from books. What matters is a person who has actually run equipment on a production line, solved process problems, lowered defect rates, and raised yields. The Samsung-CXMT case involving handwritten process recipes, the attempted replication of a Samsung fab, and the attempted removal of SK Hynix HBM process materials are repeatedly cited as examples supporting this view.
Fourth, they argue that Korean courts impose weak punishments. On conservative YouTube channels and social media, there are repeated calls to treat technology leakage not as ordinary trade-secret infringement or a corporate dispute, but at the level of espionage or economic espionage. Even in the Samsung-CXMT case, prosecutors noted that punishment for technology leakage crimes is low compared with the scale of damage and that recovering criminal proceeds is difficult. Reports have also noted that some in business and legal circles support the introduction of an economic espionage offense. Conservatives argue that transferring national core technology to China should be treated not as simple corporate damage, but as an economic security crime that threatens national survival.
The attempted replication of a Samsung semiconductor plant has been one of the most heavily discussed cases on conservative YouTube channels and social media. Conservatives did not see it as a simple industrial technology leak. They interpreted it as a case in which “China tried to copy an entire Korean semiconductor plant.” Phrases such as “industrial spy,” “economic spy,” and “semiconductor treason” appeared repeatedly. Conservatives see the case as evidence that trained personnel and factory-operation know-how from inside Korean companies can be used directly in China’s semiconductor self-reliance strategy.
The Samsung 10-nanometer-class DRAM technology leak to CXMT has been interpreted in the same way. On conservative social media, this case is described as “China taking Korea’s memory technology together with the people.” The detail that a Samsung researcher copied process recipes by hand before moving to CXMT caused particular shock. The fact that he did not copy files or take photos, but hand-transcribed core process conditions, led many to conclude that security systems alone cannot stop people.
The SK Hynix HBM-related technology leak cases were also widely discussed on conservative YouTube channels and social media. HBM is a core component for AI servers and high-performance computing equipment, and under U.S. restrictions on China’s access to AI semiconductors, it is one of the technologies China needs most. Conservatives do not view these cases as mere misconduct by a supplier employee. They see them as signals that China is targeting Korea’s HBM, packaging, hybrid bonding, and yield-management technologies.
Reactions from internal corporate communities such as Blind also intensified conservative concern. When reports emerged during Samsung Electronics labor-management negotiations that a post had said, in effect, “if negotiations collapse, I will move to CXMT and leak technology,” conservatives did not treat it as a simple joke. Responses included: “if key personnel become dissatisfied with the company, Chinese firms will take them immediately,” “internal dissatisfaction becomes a recruitment channel for China,” and “people management matters more than security pledges.”
These domestic concerns cannot be completely dismissed because actual cases have already appeared repeatedly. The attempted replication of a Samsung fab, the CXMT DRAM process leak, the attempted leak of SK Hynix HBM-related materials, the Semes equipment technology leak, and the OLED technology leak all strengthen the perception that China is targeting Korea’s advanced manufacturing personnel and field know-how.
Therefore, the voices of conservative citizens are also evidence of how this issue is being understood inside Korea. At this point, Korean domestic opinion becomes an important signal for the United States to watch.
Inside South Korean society, a growing number of people already see Chinese semiconductor talent recruitment and technology leakage as “economic security,” “industrial espionage,” and “weakening of the allied technology network.” When the U.S. Department of Defense assesses Chinese Communist Party influence inside Korea, it must look not only at official investigations, but also at these conservative public concerns inside Korea. They show that part of Korean society already understands China’s technology recruitment not as ordinary industrial competition, but as a security threat.
Conclusion: China Targets People Before Technology
When these cases are viewed together, China’s method is clear. China is not only stealing documents from Korean semiconductor companies. It is targeting people trained inside Korean firms, the process conditions they have learned through experience, equipment operation experience, yield-improvement know-how, supplier technologies, and experience working in Chinese subsidiaries.
The Samsung fab replication attempt targeted the factory operation system itself. The CXMT case targeted DRAM process recipes and key process personnel. The SK Hynix HBM cases targeted core memory technology in the AI semiconductor supply chain. The Semes cases targeted equipment and bottlenecks in cleaning processes. The OLED and display cases show that Korea’s broader advanced manufacturing ecosystem is becoming a Chinese target.
From the U.S. Department of Defense perspective, this problem does not end as an industrial secrecy case. U.S. Forces Korea operate inside Korea through communications, maintenance, logistics, defense industry links, and semiconductor and electronics supply chains. U.S. AI semiconductor controls are not merely policies for commercial competition among private companies. They are security policies designed to slow China’s military AI, surveillance systems, command and control, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems development. If Korea’s HBM, DRAM, advanced packaging, and equipment operation know-how move to Chinese companies, China can reduce the AI and military technology bottlenecks that the United States has tried to preserve.
The defense supply chain is directly connected. Modern weapons systems cannot function without semiconductors. Missiles, radar, satellites, drones, electronic warfare equipment, communications systems, and AI-based intelligence analysis systems all depend on high-performance semiconductors, advanced packaging, and stable memory supply chains. Korean semiconductor firms are not simply commercial partners in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. They are part of the allied technology base. If China absorbs Korean process personnel and yield know-how, the United States loses part of the supply-chain advantage it built to pressure China.
In particular, SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, and HiSilicon are core pillars of China’s foundry, DRAM, NAND, and Chinese AI and communications semiconductor ecosystems. If these companies absorb Korean personnel and Korean technical experience, China fills the gaps left by equipment restrictions, chip export restrictions, and technology controls with people. Even if the United States blocks equipment and chips, if people move, China can find answers on the production line. This is the danger the Department of Defense must see. Korean semiconductor personnel leakage is a loss for Korean companies, but at the same time it affects U.S. AI semiconductor controls, defense supply chain stability, and the information and operational environment of U.S. Forces Korea.
If Korea cannot protect its people, it will be difficult to protect its technology. Even if technology documents are not stolen, China can shorten its development timeline if the people who have actually implemented that technology move. Chinese companies put Korean-trained personnel into Chinese production lines, and a few years later Korean companies have to compete in the market against Chinese firms helped by those same people. Korea loses people first, then technology, and finally the market.
Selected Sources and References
Accessed: June 25, 2026.
Reuters.
Sources for the former Samsung executive’s alleged copycat chip-factory case in China, the later detention involving alleged 20-nanometer DRAM process technology theft, the Samsung–CXMT 10-nanometer-class DRAM technology leak case, the reported HBM connection, the seven-year prison sentence, CXMT’s DRAM expansion plans, and YMTC’s planned NAND production expansion.
DigiTimes.
Source for the SK Hynix HBM packaging technology leak attempt involving a former subcontractor employee.
Business Korea.
Sources for the SK Hynix–HiSilicon-related technology leak allegations involving HBM, advanced packaging, and related semiconductor technologies; the SEMES semiconductor cleaning equipment technology leak case; and the OLED manufacturing technology leak case involving a former Samsung Display researcher.
KBS World.
Source for the SEMES semiconductor cleaning equipment technology leak case involving former employees accused of stealing and selling key semiconductor technology.
Federal Register / U.S. Department of Commerce.
Source for SMIC’s Entity List designation based on U.S. concerns over China’s military-civil fusion policy.
Korean National Police Agency / Korean media reports.
Sources for South Korea’s overseas technology leak statistics, including China-related cases, national core technology leaks, insider involvement, and SME vulnerability.
KISTEP / Yonhap / TrendForce.
Sources for expert assessments indicating that China has caught up with or surpassed South Korea in several semiconductor technology areas, including AI semiconductors, power semiconductors, advanced sensing, and advanced packaging.
National Assembly legislative materials / Ministry of Government Legislation.
Sources for the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act amendment known as the “Yellow Envelope Act,” including changes related to the scope of “employer,” the scope of labor disputes, and limits on damage claims arising from union activity.
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